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REVISITING ROOKER-FELDMAN: EXTENDING
THE DOCTRINE TO STATE COURT
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
DUSTIN E. BUEHLER*
ABSTRACT
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. After decades of
confusion, the Supreme Court recently clarified the scope and proper application of the doctrine in two cases, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis. However, the Court left a key question
unanswered: which state court “judgments” trigger the protection of Rooker-Feldman? Does the doctrine prohibit lower federal courts from reviewing
only final state court judgments? Or does it also prohibit review of state
court interlocutory orders, such as stays, preliminary injunctions, rulings
on pretrial motions, and discovery orders? The circuits are split on this issue. This Article examines the evolution and purpose of Rooker-Feldman
and concludes that the doctrine should protect all state court judgments,
including interlocutory orders. This is the only approach that respects interests vital to the interaction between state and federal courts, including
separation of powers, federalism, and parity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to hear appeals from final state court judgments.1 By comparison,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts can only exercise “original jurisdiction,”2 not appellate jurisdiction.3 In Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co.4 and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,5
the Supreme Court interpreted these two statutes and held that
lower federal courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state
court judgments.6
At first blush, this rule seems logical and straightforward. Over
the years, however, an “impermeable cover of jurisprudential kudzu
has grown” from this seemingly simple rule.7 Judges and scholars
have heaped scathing criticism on the “so-called Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.”8 They argue that the doctrine is confusing,9 that it serves
no useful purpose,10 and that it gets conflated with abstention and
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
3. See id.
4. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
5. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
6. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.
7. Allison B. Jones, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Mean to Be
Inextricably Intertwined?, 56 DUKE L.J. 643, 643 (2006).
8. Indeed, the prevalent use of the phrase “so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine” itself
suggests that many judges and scholars view the doctrine as questionable or illegitimate.
See, e.g., Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 468 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); R.G. Fin. Corp. v. VergaraNuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 188 n.3 (1st Cir. 2006); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d
1270, 1281 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1022 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 7, at 643.
10. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Comment, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let
State Law Be Our Guide, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1999) (“The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is an oddity in the law. In fact, I have been unable to think of another legal doc-
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preclusion doctrines.11 Some even argue that the doctrine should be
abolished outright.12 After the Supreme Court recently emphasized
the narrowness of the doctrine,13 a few critics gleefully announced
that Rooker-Feldman was finally dead.14
Alas, to the annoyance of those intent on hauling RookerFeldman off for burial, the corpse keeps shouting, “I am not dead
yet!”15 Lower federal courts continue to use the doctrine as a “docketclearing workhorse.”16 During the year following the Supreme Court’s
most recent Rooker-Feldman decision, lower federal courts invoked
the doctrine more than 500 times and used it to bar federal jurisdiction in approximately seventy percent of those cases.17 Despite the
wishful thinking of the doctrine’s many detractors, these numbers
highlight an inconvenient truth—the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
alive and here to stay.18

trine that lacks both a clear role and a clear justification.”); Gary Thompson, Note, The
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts,
42 RUTGERS L. REV. 859, 861 (1990) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is unnecessary and
potentially harmful.”).
11. See, e.g., Rachel Thomas Rowley, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: A Mere Superfluous Nuance or a Vital Civil Procedure Doctrine? An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Johnson v. Rodrigues, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 321, 321 (2000) (“Rooker-Feldman is often misapplied as an abstention or preclusion doctrine and courts exacerbate the problem
by continually using the three doctrines interchangeably.”).
12. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, from the Ground
Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1999) (“Our conclusions may be summarized
simply: Feldman itself should be overruled. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be abolished.”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 862 (calling for “the end to recognition of RookerFeldman as an independent doctrine of federal court jurisdiction”).
13. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curiam); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
14. One commentator published a mock obituary for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
dating its death as February 21, 2006, the day of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lance v.
Dennis. See Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 GREEN BAG 2D 317, 317 (2006).
Speaking for the many detractors of “Mr. Feldman,” the obituary opined: “It is hoped that
he leaves no survivors. Funeral services will be held in the National Cathedral on Friday,
February 24, 2006, at 2:00 p.m.” Id. at 318. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens has
proclaimed the death of Rooker-Feldman at least twice. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S.
293, 318 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Lance, 546 U.S. at 468 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
15. The author confesses this is a not-so-subtle reference to Broadway’s Spamalot,
and, reaching farther back, to Monty Python and the Holy Grail.
16. Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1999).
17. A Westlaw search of all federal cases in which the word “Rooker” and “Feldman”
appeared in the same sentence showed that between February 22, 2006, and February 22,
2007—the year immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lance v. Dennis—
lower federal courts cited Rooker-Feldman in 682 decisions and addressed whether the
doctrine was applicable in 524 of those decisions. Lower federal courts used RookerFeldman to bar jurisdiction for at least some of the litigants’ claims in 381 cases,
representing 72.7% of the cases in which the doctrine was analyzed.
18. See, e.g., O’Callaghan v. Harvey, 233 F. App’x 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2007); Chapman v.
Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006).
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If we are stuck with Rooker-Feldman, we should at least understand what it is and what role it plays. Unfortunately, this is not an
easy task. Lower federal courts disagree on the doctrine’s scope and
proper application19 and often confuse it with preclusion doctrines,
especially res judicata.20 Given how frequently courts use RookerFeldman to bar federal jurisdiction, it is surprising how muddled it is
and how infrequently scholars analyze it.21
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify Rooker-Feldman in two
recent decisions—Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp.22 and Lance v. Dennis.23 In these cases, the Court held that the
doctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”24 In other words, entry of a
state court judgment triggers the doctrine. After the state court files
its judgment, the losing party must appeal through the state court
system and cannot attempt to overturn the judgment by filing a new
lawsuit in federal district court.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court left a key question unanswered: which state court “judgments” trigger the protection of Rooker-Feldman?25 Does the doctrine prohibit federal district courts from
reviewing only final state court judgments? Or does it also prevent
federal district courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over
state court interlocutory decisions, such as stays, preliminary injunctions, rulings on pretrial motions, and discovery orders? Federal cir19. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1440 (5th ed. 2003) (“The lower courts, which have often found
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine relevant and even dispositive, have not agreed on its proper
scope or application.”); Adam McLain, Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a
Workable Role, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1555, 1573 (2001) (“[C]ourts are confused and consequently are misapplying the doctrine.”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 880 (“Lower court interpretations of Feldman have been mixed.”).
20. See, e.g., Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d
Cir. 1996) (“[W]here a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding . . . , subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion.”), abrogated by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d
271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (characterizing Rooker-Feldman as “a combination of the abstention and res judicata doctrines”).
21. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1175-76 (“Federal courts scholars and casebook authors, most likely taking their cue from the Supreme Court’s lack of attention to the doctrine, have themselves given it little or no attention.”).
22. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
23. 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 464; Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
25. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][c][ii]
(3d ed. 2006); Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate
Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 144 (2006) [hereinafter Sherry, Logic
Without Experience].
AND THE

2009]

REVISITING ROOKER-FELDMAN

377

cuit courts are split on this question,26 and scholars have not analyzed the issue in depth.27 There is no resolution on this aspect of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, despite its importance.28
This Article bridges that gap. Part II examines the evolution of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Rooker to its recent decisions in Exxon Mobil and Lance. This analysis shows that the Supreme Court has clarified the scope of RookerFeldman, but it has not addressed whether the doctrine applies only
to final state court judgments or also to state court interlocutory orders. We must look beyond existing case law for an answer.
Part III of this Article examines the purposes of the RookerFeldman doctrine. The doctrine enforces separation of powers and
the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, advances interests of federalism by protecting state court judgments, and advances interests of
parity by recognizing that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate federal claims. This portion of the Article concludes that courts
should reason from these underlying principles when analyzing unanswered questions about Rooker-Feldman.
Part IV examines the current circuit split on whether the RookerFeldman doctrine bars suits in federal district court that challenge
state court interlocutory orders. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits use a narrow approach, applying Rooker-Feldman only to final state court judgments. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and District of
Columbia Circuits use a broad approach, extending Rooker-Feldman
to all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. The
First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits use an intermediate approach, applying Rooker-Feldman to some—but not all—state court
interlocutory orders.

26. E.g., compare TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005)
(emphasizing that Rooker-Feldman protects only final state court judgments), and Amos v.
Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003) (same), and
FDIC v. Meyerland Co. (In re Meyerland Co.), 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (same),
with Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (same), and Pieper
v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Rooker-Feldman
to state court interlocutory orders), and Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513,
1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same), and Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir.
1996) (same).
27. Recent scholarship offers only brief analysis on whether Rooker-Feldman extends
to state court interlocutory orders post-Exxon Mobil. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined” Explicable at Last? Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 21-23
(2006), http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2006/fedctslrev1.pdf; Sherry, Logic Without
Experience, supra note 25, at 144.
28. With federal courts invoking Rooker-Feldman in more than 500 cases each year,
supra note 17, any split in circuit authority on the doctrine’s scope has far-reaching consequences for hundreds of litigants.

378

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:373

Finally, Part V concludes that the Supreme Court should resolve
this circuit split by adopting the broad approach, extending RookerFeldman to state court interlocutory orders. The broad approach is
the only rule that is consistent with the purposes of the doctrine. It
keeps lower federal courts within the boundaries of their statutory
jurisdiction, advances principles of federalism, and recognizes that
state courts are fully competent to adjudicate federal claims. By
adopting this approach, the Supreme Court can ensure that RookerFeldman reflects the limits of the statutory jurisdiction of federal
courts. Under those statutes, lower federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, including those judgments that
are interlocutory in nature.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arises from two cases decided sixty
years apart, in which the Supreme Court held that federal district
courts have no appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.29 After more than twenty years of confusion in the lower federal courts,30
the Supreme Court clarified the doctrine’s scope in its recent decisions in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.31 and
Lance v. Dennis.32 However, these decisions fail to address whether
the doctrine applies only to final state court judgments or also protects state court interlocutory orders.33
A. A Simple Rule Erects a Gate Against Jurisdiction: The Supreme
Court’s Decision in Rooker
The Supreme Court laid the cornerstone of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in its 1923 decision in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.34 Dora
and William Rooker owned real estate in Indiana.35 Financial
embarrassment from the prohibitive cost of improvements to their
property36 led the Rookers to deed their land to Fidelity Trust Company in exchange for a loan that they failed to repay.37 The result of
29. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); see also infra Parts II.A., Part II.B.
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
32. 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam); see also infra Part II.D.
33. See infra Part II.E.
34. 263 U.S. at 415-16.
35. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769, 770 (Ind. 1921).
36. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U.S. 114, 115 (1923); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 109 N.E. 766, 766 (Ind. 1915).
37. Rooker, 131 N.E. at 771-72. Under the arrangement, Fidelity, as trustee, was to
advance moneys for [the Rookers’] benefit, assist in procuring advances from
others, protect the title, ultimately sell the land, use the proceeds in satisfying
such mortgages or liens as might be superior to the rights of the trustee and in
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this transaction was twenty-four years of litigation in state and federal courts.38
After two rounds of litigation in Indiana state courts,39 the Rookers filed an action in federal district court, seeking to have the state
court judgment “declared null and void.”40 The Rookers argued that
the state court decision violated the U.S. Constitution because it gave
effect to an unconstitutional state law and contradicted prior state
court rulings.41 The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction and
dismissed the suit.42
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the case.43 The Court held that federal district courts do
not have appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.44 First,
the Court drew a negative inference from its own statutory grant of
appellate jurisdiction.45 Because the statute explicitly vests only the
Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over final state court
repaying moneys advanced by it and by others, and turn the residue over to the
wife, her personal representatives or assigns.
Rooker, 261 U.S. at 115.
38. See generally McLain, supra note 19, at 1560-63 (describing the factual and procedural history of the Rooker litigation). The Rookers first filed suit in Indiana circuit court
on October 30, 1912. See Rooker, 109 N.E. at 768. More than twenty-four years later, the
final disposal in the litigation occurred when the Indiana Court of Appeals denied Dora
Rooker’s appeal from a judgment striking her complaint from the files. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 5 N.E.2d 140, 140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1936) (en banc).
39. The first round of state court litigation focused on whether the contract was a
trust agreement or mortgage, with the Indiana Supreme Court ruling that a trust had
been created. Rooker, 109 N.E. at 768-70. In the second round of state court litigation, the
trial court applied the law of trusts, holding that Fidelity had “faithfully performed its duties as trustee” and had a right to sell the property and distribute the proceeds according to
the terms of the contract. Rooker, 131 N.E. at 773. After the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, id. at 776, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the judgment on writ of error, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, and dismissed the case. See
Rooker, 261 U.S. at 118.
40. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923).
41. Id. The Rookers argued that the Indiana state court judgment violated the Contracts Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
See id.
42. See id. at 415.
43. Id. (“[T]he suit is so plainly not within the District Court’s jurisdiction as defined
by Congress that the motion to affirm must be sustained.”).
44. Id. at 416.
45. See id. At the time of the Rooker opinion, section 237 of the Judicial Code was the
statutory basis for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over final state court judgments. See
Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726 (1916) (“A final judgment or decree in
any suit in the highest court of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, [implicating a federal question,] may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme
Court upon a writ of error.”); Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (citing Judicial Code, section 237, as
amended Act. of Sept. 6, 1916). Today, the relevant grant of statutory jurisdiction formerly
conveyed by section 237 of the Judicial Code is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). Gayle
Gerson, Note, A Return to Practicality: Reforming the Fourth Cox Exception to the Final
Judgment Rule Governing Supreme Court Certiorari Review of State Court Judgments, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 794-95 n.33 (2004).
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judgments, federal district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over
such judgments.46 Second, the Court drew another inference from the
statutory grant of jurisdiction for federal district courts, which is
“strictly original.”47 Because the statute conveys only original jurisdiction, district courts cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction.48 In other words, if Congress wanted federal district courts to have appellate
jurisdiction over state court judgments, it would have said so. Congress did not convey such jurisdiction, so no jurisdiction exists.
For sixty years, courts and commentators largely ignored the
Rooker decision or conflated its simple rule with other doctrines.49
The Supreme Court cited the case only twice, both times while applying res judicata.50 Lower federal courts cited the rule from Rooker infrequently,51 and when they did, they often confused it with res judicata52 or Younger abstention.53 The only significant academic article
46. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (“Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the
United States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify
[state court] judgment[s] . . . .”).
47. Id. The Court based its premise of district court original jurisdiction on section 24
of the Judicial Code. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (1911) (“The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows . . . .” (emphasis added)); Rooker,
263 U.S. at 416 (citing Judicial Code, section 24). Today, the relevant grant of statutory jurisdiction formerly conveyed by section 24 of the Judicial Code is contained in 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (2006). See McLain, supra note 19, at 1563 (“[The Rooker] holding was based on inferences drawn from the precursors to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257 and 1331, which grant jurisdiction
to review certain state court judgments to the Supreme Court and original jurisdiction to
federal district courts, respectively.”). In addition to § 1331, other statutory provisions also
convey original jurisdiction to federal district courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S. § 1330(a) (2006) (actions against foreign states); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (diversity of citizenship); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (2006) (admiralty and maritime).
48. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (“To [allow district courts to review state court judgments] would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by the
District Courts is strictly original.”).
49. E.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1437 (Rooker was “largely forgotten” until
1980); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1133 (“Rooker . . . for the most part lay dormant for sixty years.”); Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The RookerFeldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1999) [hereinafter Sherry, Judicial Federalism] (“For six decades, lower courts applied Rooker sporadically, often
using it interchangeably with doctrines of preclusion—which were themselves in some disarray.”); McLain, supra note 19, at 1563 (noting that before the Feldman decision, “Rooker
was not particularly influential, and it was cited infrequently over subsequent decades”).
50. The Court cited Rooker in a decision holding that res judicata barred relitigation
of a union’s collective bargaining agreement. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,
328 U.S. 275, 282-83 (1946). Justice White also cited Rooker in a case in which the petitioner argued that res judicata precluded federal court review of a state court judgment.
See Fla. State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960, 961 (1971) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). Given this context, it is not surprising that lower federal courts
conflated Rooker and res judicata. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1180 (“[Rooker] was cited
sporadically in the following years, and was often mentioned interchangeably with
res judicata.”).
51. See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1133.
52. See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Hutcherson v.
Lehtin, 485 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Props.,
Inc., 480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (1st Cir.
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to analyze the Rooker case during this period argued that the doctrine had a scope identical to res judicata.54
B. Extending the Rooker Principle: The Supreme Court’s Decision
in Feldman
With little warning, the dormant Rooker doctrine erupted in 1983
when the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.55 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied
two applications seeking waivers from a bar admission rule that
made it difficult for graduates of unaccredited law schools to sit for
the bar exam.56 The rejected applicants, Marc Feldman57 and Edward
Hickey,58 each filed suit in federal district court, contending that the
ruling by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals violated federal
constitutional rights and antitrust laws.59 The district court dis-

1972) (citing the rule from Rooker to support its holding that collateral estoppel bars appellant’s claim).
53. See, e.g., Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 251-53 (5th Cir. 1973) (invoking Rooker to
support its holding that Younger abstention bars plaintiff’s federal action); Aristocrat
Health Club of Hartford, Inc. v. Chaucer, 451 F. Supp. 210, 218-19 (D. Conn. 1978) (citing
the rule from Rooker as one of several reasons for applying Younger abstention); Sole v.
Grand Jurors, 393 F. Supp. 1322, 1331 n.17 (D.N.J. 1975); see also Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (establishing abstention doctrine based on “the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under
special circumstances”).
54. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res
Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1341 (1980) (“Because any claim
that the federal district courts would lack jurisdiction to hear under Rooker also would be
barred by a previous judgment under principles of res judicata, the scope of claim preclusion is identical under the two doctrines.”).
55. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
56. See id. at 464-72. The rule required applicants for the District of Columbia bar exam to submit certificates verifying that they graduated from an accredited law school. Id.
at 464-65. Alternatively, an unaccredited law school graduate could sit for the bar exam
“only after receiving credit for 24 semester hours of study in a law school that at the time
of study was approved by the American Bar Association and with Committee approval.” Id.
at 465 n.1.
57. Rather than attending law school, Feldman completed an alternative program offered by the Commonwealth of Virginia in which he worked in an attorney’s office in Charlottesville, audited law classes at the University of Virginia, and served as a law clerk for a
federal district court judge. Id. at 465. He passed the Virginia bar exam and began working
as a staff attorney for a Baltimore legal aid bureau. Id. Although Maryland had a rule similar to the one used by the District of Columbia, Feldman had obtained a waiver and
passed the Maryland bar exam. Id.
58. Hickey attended unaccredited Potomac School of Law in Washington, D.C. after
spending twenty years in the Navy. Id. at 470. While Hickey was a student, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals granted waivers of the bar exam rule to graduates of another
unaccredited law school, leading him to believe that he too would receive a waiver. Id. Immediately before Hickey graduated, however, the Court of Appeals announced that it
would no longer grant such waivers. Id.
59. Id. at 467-69, 471-72.
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missed both cases, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an
order of the highest court of the District of Columbia.60
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court with regard to the constitutional claims.61
The circuit court acknowledged that “[r]eview of a final judgment of
the highest judicial tribunal of a state is vested solely in the Supreme
Court of the United States.”62 However, it held that the federal district court did have jurisdiction because the prior proceedings in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals were not judicial in nature.63
The circuit court reasoned that Feldman and Hickey had merely petitioned for waiver of an admission requirement—“[t]hey did not seek
review by the Court of Appeals of the decision of any other body or
individual; they did not request the court to invalidate any rule; nor
did they ask for anything as a matter of right.”64
The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding
that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
several of the federal claims.65 The Court initially stated that “the
United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial
proceedings.”66 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, “[r]eview of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court.”67 Next, the Court concluded
that the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
were judicial in nature.68 Although court action on Feldman and
Hickey’s initial petitions “did not assume the form commonly associated with judicial proceedings,”69 it nonetheless “involved a ‘judicial
60. See id. at 470, 473.
61. Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversing and remanding the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claims). The D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of Feldman and Hickey’s antitrust claims. Id. at 1308.
62. Id. at 1310. Interestingly, the circuit court did not cite the Rooker decision in its
opinion, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Feldman cites Rooker only once as
part of a string citation. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. The “Rooker-Feldman doctrine” label did not surface until three years later in a Second Circuit decision. See Texaco Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). The Supreme
Court’s reversal of this decision gave Justice Scalia an opportunity to label the pairing as
the “so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
63. Feldman, 661 F.2d at 1310.
64. Id. at 1320. After concluding that the district court had jurisdiction, the circuit
court also concluded that res judicata did not preclude the suit. Id. at 1319-20.
65. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also denied Feldman and Hickey’s
cross-petitions for certiorari as to the antitrust claims. Id. at 474 n.11.
66. Id. at 476. Although the District of Columbia is not a state, its court of appeals is
considered the equivalent of the highest court of a state for purposes of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s statutory jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(b) (2006) (“For the purposes of this section,
the term ‘highest court of a State’ includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.”).
67. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
68. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479.
69. Id. at 482.
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inquiry’ in which the [District of Columbia Court of Appeals] was
called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce ‘liabilities as they
[stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already
to exist.’ ”70
The Court attempted to define circumstances in which a litigant
improperly seeks review of a state court judgment.71 It held that district courts “have subject-matter jurisdiction over general challenges
to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state-court judgment in a
particular case.”72 However, the Court held that district courts lack
jurisdiction “over challenges to state-court decisions, in particular
cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.”73 In other
words, federal constitutional claims requiring review of a final state
court decision in a particular case are “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court judgment and may be appealed only to the U.S. Supreme Court.74
Applying this test, the Supreme Court concluded that Feldman
and Hickey’s due process and equal protection claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions.75 The district court did not have jurisdiction over these claims
because they were as-applied challenges arising from the denial of
the waiver petitions.76 However, the Supreme Court held that district
court jurisdiction was proper for Feldman and Hickey’s general challenges to the constitutionality of the bar admission rule, because
those claims did not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case.77
The Feldman decision clarified and expanded the rule from Rooker. First, the Supreme Court confirmed that the principle from Rooker—that federal district courts cannot hear appeals from state court
judgments—is a jurisdictional bar.78 Second, this jurisdictional rule
70. Id. at 479 (first alteration added) (quoting Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S.
210, 226 (1908)).
71. See id. at 482-86.
72. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 486-87.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 487. However, the Court “expressly [did] not reach the question of whether
the doctrine of res judicata forecloses litigation on these elements of the complaints.” Id. at
487-88.
78. See id. at 482 (“[T]o the extent that Hickey and Feldman sought review in the District Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of their petitions for waiver,
the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints.”); see also Rowley, supra note 11, at 324 (explaining that Feldman “upheld the idea that Rooker was a
doctrine grounded in jurisdictional theories”).
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prohibits district courts from reviewing state court judicial decisions,
but it does not prevent review of state court administrative or legislative rulings.79 Third, Feldman prevents district courts from hearing
not only blatant appeals of state court decisions (as in Rooker), but
also claims that a party raises for the first time in federal district
court that are inextricably intertwined with prior state court judgments.80 After Feldman, plaintiffs could no longer make an end run
around Rooker merely by recasting an appeal as a “new” claim in federal district court.81
C. Fleeting References and Widespread Confusion: Federal Courts
Apply (and Misapply) the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The expanded Rooker-Feldman rule caused mass confusion in the
lower federal courts.82 For more than two decades, the Supreme
Court provided little guidance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.83 Two
Supreme Court decisions were marginally helpful. In Johnson v. De
Grandy,84 the Court narrowly characterized Rooker-Feldman and
79. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1182-83.
80. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16; see also Rowley, supra note 11, at 325 (“By
adding this additional inquiry, the Feldman court extended the Rooker doctrine from issues that were actually decided by the state court proceedings, to also include claims that
were not litigated in the state court, and are inextricably intertwined with the merits of
the state court.”).
81. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 875 (“[I]f plaintiffs who lose in state court recast
their claims in federal court under the guise of federal constitutional claims that were not
raised or actually decided by the state court, Rooker and Feldman will nonetheless preclude jurisdiction if the constitutional claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the merits
of the state court judgment.”).
82. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1183 (“Unfortunately, nothing in Feldman explains
the rationale for the language [‘inextricably intertwined’] or gives any indication of its
proper scope.”); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1136 (“Feldman muddied more waters than it cleared.”); Jones, supra note 7, at 651 (“After Feldman, district courts were left
wondering how to apply its new standards—how to differentiate between general and particular challenges, and especially, how to identify when a claim is inextricably intertwined
with a challenge to a state court judgment.”).
83. Between its 1983 decision in Feldman and its 2005 decision in Exxon Mobil, the
Supreme Court briefly mentioned the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in only six cases. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16 (1990); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622–23 (1989); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987); id. at
18 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 28
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
84. 512 U.S. 997 (1994). Johnson involved a challenge to a Florida state legislative
reapportionment plan. See id. at 1000-01. Plaintiffs argued that the legislative districts violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by unlawfully diluting the voting strength of
Hispanics and blacks. Id. at 1001-02; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). The Florida
Supreme Court reviewed the plan, as required by the state constitution. See Johnson, 512
U.S. at 1001. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court. Id. at 1000-02. The U.S. Supreme
Court held, in part, that the Florida Supreme Court decision did not preclude the plaintiffs’
federal suit. See id. at 1004-05.
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seemed to suggest that only parties to the underlying state court proceeding could invoke the doctrine in federal court.85 The Court also
implied that the doctrine bars suits only if the federal plaintiff lost in
state court and complained of an injury caused by the state court
judgment itself, rather than a prior injury caused by an adverse party.86 Similarly, a footnote in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of Maryland87 downplayed the role of the doctrine, stating that it “merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress
has reserved to this Court.”88 The Court did note, however, that “[t]he
doctrine has no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency.”89 Although these decisions used dicta to hint at Rooker-Feldman’s proper
scope, they gave little guidance on how lower courts should apply
the doctrine.90
Despite the lack of Supreme Court elaboration, there was an “explosive growth” of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the lower federal

85. See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1006 (“[T]he invocation of Rooker/Feldman is just as inapt here, for unlike Rooker or Feldman, the United States was not a party in the state
court.” (emphasis added)).
86. See id. (“[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance
would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on
the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”
(emphasis added)).
87. 535 U.S. 635 (2002). Verizon involved litigation under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, which required existing local-exchange carriers to share their networks with
competitors by entering into interconnection agreements and reciprocal compensation
agreements with new market entrants. See id. at 638. The Act required carriers to submit
these agreements to a state utility commission for approval. Id. at 639. A dispute arose as
to whether Internet Service Provider traffic was “local traffic” subject to an existing reciprocal compensation agreement. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). WorldCom filed a
complaint with the Public Service Commission of Maryland, which ruled against Verizon.
Id. After unsuccessfully appealing the Commission’s order in state court, Verizon filed suit
in federal district court, naming the Commission and WorldCom as defendants. Id. at 63940. The Court held in part that the Telecommunications Act did not divest the federal district court of its jurisdiction to review the Commission’s determination. Id. at 641-42.
88. Id. at 644 n.3.
89. Id. The Court presumably was emphasizing a distinction made in the Feldman
decision, which held that Rooker-Feldman only bars federal court review of decisions rendered in state court proceedings that are judicial in nature. See D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (“[T]he United States District Court is without
authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
judicial proceedings.”).
90. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1440 (“[T]he Supreme Court, which has applied the doctrine only twice (in the Rooker and Feldman cases themselves), has done virtually nothing to give [lower federal courts] guidance.”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., RookerFeldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083
(1999) (noting “the lack of focused Supreme Court attention since the Feldman decision
in 1983”).
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courts.91 Confusion was prevalent on many issues.92 Not surprisingly,
courts disagreed on the meaning of the phrase “inextricably intertwined.”93 Some circuits conflated Rooker-Feldman with preclusion
doctrines (especially res judicata),94 while others insisted that RookerFeldman is a distinct and independent doctrine.95 Many courts concluded that Rooker-Feldman applies only to litigants who were parties to the prior state court proceedings,96 while other courts applied
the doctrine to suits by nonparties.97 Although most circuits held that
91. See McLain, supra note 19, at 1573.
92. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1440 (“The lower courts, which have often
found the Rooker-Feldman doctrine relevant and even dispositive, have not agreed on its
proper scope or application.”); McLain, supra note 19, at 1573 (“[C]ourts are confused and
consequently are misapplying the doctrine.”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 880 (“Lower
court interpretations of Feldman have been mixed.”).
93. See Jones, supra note 7, at 643 (“Supreme Court opacity concerning what it means
to be inextricably intertwined has resulted in significant incongruity in the lower federal
courts . . . .” (citation omitted)).
94. See, e.g., Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d
Cir. 1996) (“ ‘[I]nextricably intertwined’ means, at a minimum, that where a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding . . . , subsequent litigation
of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be barred under
the principles of preclusion.”), abrogated by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005); Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[O]ur Circuit has
not allowed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar an action in federal court when that same
action would be allowed in the state court of the rendering state.” (citing Gauthier v. Cont’l
Diving Serv. Inc., 831 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271,
274 (6th Cir. 1995) (characterizing Rooker-Feldman as “a combination of the abstention
and res judicata doctrines”); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“[W]e have read Rooker not as a jurisdictional barrier but as an application of res judicata.” (citing Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 485 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Francisco Enters., Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481, 485
(9th Cir. 1973))), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
95. See, e.g., Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“[A]lthough the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of preclusion may be easily confused with each other because they both define the respect one court owes to an earlier
judgment, the two are not coextensive.” (citing GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d
726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993))); Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We have
consistently emphasized the distinction between res judicata and Rooker-Feldman and insisted that the applicability of Rooker-Feldman be decided before considering res judicata.”); Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We note that
Rooker-Feldman is broader than claim and issue preclusion because it does not depend on
a final judgment on the merits.”).
96. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), 226 F.3d 1103, 1109 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not be applied against non-parties.”); Bennett v.
Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[S]ince the new plaintiffs were not parties
to the state suit, their suit is not barred by the Rooker/Feldman doctrine.”); Owens, 54
F.3d at 274 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to bar a suit in federal court
brought by a party that was not a party in the preceding action in state court.” (citing Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992))); Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir.
1995) (“[T]he plaintiffs in this case are not, by the admission of all parties, parties to the
circuit court action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to such circumstances.”
(citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994))).
97. See, e.g., Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 478 (10th Cir. 2002), overruling recognized by Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 n.10 (2006) (“Rooker-Feldman bars
any suit that seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether
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Rooker-Feldman applies to lower state court judgments,98 they vigorously debated whether the doctrine applies only to final state court
judgments or whether it also protects interlocutory orders.99
These divergent approaches demonstrate that two decades of
near silence from the Supreme Court caused mass confusion regarding Rooker-Feldman.100 Scholars begged the Court to weigh in on the
doctrine, with the hope that it would clarify the scope and proper application of the doctrine.101

the state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to
litigate her claims.” (citing Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991); Anderson v.
Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1986))); Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488,
495 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[Lower federal] courts are simply without authority to review most
state court judgments—regardless of who might request them to do so.” (citing Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Sherry, Judicial Federalism, supra note 49, at
1112-23)); Garry, 82 F.3d at 1367 n.8 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[U]nder res judicata we must determine whether the party against whom the defense is raised had a full and fair opportunity to pursue its claim in the previous state proceeding. . . . Rooker-Feldman does not contain analogous limitations.” (citation omitted)).
98. See, e.g., Gisslen v. City of Crystal, 345 F.3d 624, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The
[Rooker-Feldman] doctrine does not apply exclusively to decisions from a state’s highest
appellate court of right, but also applies with equal force to decisions from a state trial
court.”); Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e do not believe that lower federal courts should be prohibited from reviewing judgments of a state’s
highest court but should somehow have free rein to review the judgments of lower state
courts.”); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 165 (11th Cir. 1988) (using Rooker-Feldman
to dismiss federal suit challenging state trial court judgment and noting that an “[a]ppeal
in the state courts is the proper channel through which [plaintiff] was entitled to seek relief”); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal
Courts’ Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 141-42
(1998) (“Although it could be argued that Rooker-Feldman only bars federal court action as
to decisions that have been ruled upon by a state’s highest court, courts and commentators
have generally applied Rooker-Feldman to decisions by lower state courts as well.” (citations omitted)).
99. E.g., compare Pieper, 336 F.3d at 462 (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
federal district courts from reviewing state court interlocutory orders), and Brown & Root,
Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000) (same), and Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), with Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st
Cir. 2000) (holding that interlocutory state court judgment lacking finality does not trigger
Rooker-Feldman doctrine), and H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 612-13 (9th
Cir. 2000) (same); see also Sternlight, supra note 98, at 142 (“[I]t is not entirely clear
whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to final judgments, or also to interlocutory rulings.”).
100. See Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh,
56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947, 958 n.55 (2006) (“[S]ince the [Supreme] Court had almost
nothing to say about [Rooker-Feldman] from 1983 to 2005, the courts had ample room to
improvise.”). Indeed, in a classic example of the strange “improvisation” by lower federal
courts, at one point the Eighth Circuit mistakenly confused Rooker-Feldman with the Erie
doctrine and refused to apply state law in a diversity case. See Sherry, Judicial Federalism, supra note 49, at 1088 n.17 (citing First Commercial Trust Co. v. Colt’s Mfg., 77 F.3d
1081 (8th Cir. 1996)).
101. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 90, at 1084 (“[T]he proliferation of lower court case law
with many different emphases and some highly questionable decisions suggests that the
time may be nigh for the Supreme Court to take an opportunity to clarify the doctrine.” (citation omitted)).
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D. Clarification of a Narrow Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Recent
Decisions in Exxon Mobil and Lance
The Supreme Court finally stepped in to clarify the RookerFeldman doctrine in its 2005 decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Industries Corp.102 In July 2000, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) sued two ExxonMobil subsidiaries in Delaware state
court, seeking declaratory relief in a royalties dispute.103 Two weeks
later, ExxonMobil and its subsidiaries countersued SABIC in federal
district court.104 In March 2003, a jury rendered a verdict in the state
suit in favor of ExxonMobil’s subsidiaries.105 At the time of the state
trial court judgment, the parallel federal suit was on appeal before
the Third Circuit.106 The Third Circuit held that the suit was a “ ‘paradigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from proceeding’ ” because the federal and state claims
were identical.107 The Third Circuit also concluded that it was irrelevant that the federal suit had been filed before entry of the state
court judgment.108
The Supreme Court reversed.109 The Court made several observations in an attempt to clear up confusion in the lower federal
courts.110 It initially stated that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine, “confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the dis102. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
103. Id. at 289. Two ExxonMobil subsidiaries had formed joint ventures in 1980 with
SABIC to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. Id. (citing Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (D.N.J. 2002)). The dispute focused on SABIC’s
royalties for sublicenses for a polyethylene manufacturing method. Id. (citing Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 2004)).
104. Id.
105. See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 10-11
(Del. 2005). In January 2005, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict. Id.
at 40.
106. Exxon Mobil, 364 F.3d at 102-03 (Third Circuit decision submitted on March 24,
2004); Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (district court judgment rendered
on April 3, 2002); Mobil Yanbu, 866 A.2d at 11 (state trial court jury verdict returned on
March 21, 2003).
107. Exxon Mobil, 364 F.3d at 104 (quoting E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1090-91
(3d Cir. 1997)).
108. See id. at 104-05. The Third Circuit stated that “[t]he only timing relevant is
whether the state judgment precedes a federal judgment on the same claims.” Id. at 105.
The court expressed its concern about the policy effects of a ruling to the contrary—if it
held that Rooker-Feldman did not apply to federal actions filed prior to the state court’s final judgment, it “would be encouraging parties to maintain federal actions as ‘insurance
policies’ while their state court claims were pending.” Id.
109. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 294.
110. See id. at 291 (“We granted certiorari to resolve conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (citation omitted)); Rowe &
Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 3 (“Sweeping extensions and conflicting interpretations of
Rooker-Feldman finally led to a clarifying Supreme Court decision last year in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.”).
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trict court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments.”111 The doctrine does not bar jurisdiction if the federal plaintiff presents “some independent claim.”112
The Court also stated that the Rooker-Feldman analysis is separate
from preclusion and abstention doctrines.113 Finally—and most relevant to the facts of Exxon Mobil—“[w]hen there is parallel state and
federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the entry of judgment in state court.”114 Parallel state and federal suits are
governed by preclusion law, not Rooker-Feldman.115 Applying these
principles, the Court noted that ExxonMobil filed suit in federal district court “well before any judgment in state court.”116 Thus, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “did not emerge to vanquish jurisdiction after ExxonMobil prevailed in the Delaware courts.”117
The following year, in Lance v. Dennis, the Supreme Court once
again emphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.118 In May 2003, Colorado’s attorney general filed suit in state
court challenging the General Assembly’s congressional redistricting
plan.119 After the General Assembly intervened as a defendant, the
Colorado Supreme Court struck down the plan on state constitutional
grounds.120 Several Colorado citizens who were unhappy with the
state court judgment then filed suit in federal district court.121 The
district court held that Rooker-Feldman barred the plaintiffs’ federal

111. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
112. Id. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir.
1993)). An independent federal claim will foreclose application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine even if it “denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached.” Id. (quoting
GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 728).
113. See id. at 284.
114. Id. at 292. The Court’s rationale recognizes that a more expansive reading of the
scope of Rooker-Feldman would infringe on the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal
courts. See id. (“[N]either Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that properly invoked
concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related
question while the case remains sub judice in a federal court.”).
115. See id. at 293.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 294. The Supreme Court also rejected the policy rationale behind the Third
Circuit’s decision. See id. at 294 n.9 (“The Court of Appeals criticized ExxonMobil for
pursuing its federal suit as an ‘insurance policy’ against an adverse result in state court.
There is nothing necessarily inappropriate, however, about filing a protective action.” (citations omitted)).
118. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam).
119. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1227 (Colo. 2003).
120. See id. at 1243. The Colorado Supreme Court struck down the General Assembly’s
redistricting plan after concluding that Article V, Section 44, of the Colorado Constitution
limited redistricting to once every ten years. Id. at 1242-43.
121. Lance, 546 U.S. at 461. The federal plaintiffs alleged that the Colorado Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Article V, Section 44 of the Colorado Constitution violated the
Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
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suit.122 Applying Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court stated
that Rooker-Feldman can bar suit when the federal plaintiff was a
party in the state court proceedings or stands in privity with the
state court loser.123 Although the federal plaintiffs had not been parties to the state court suit, the court held that they stood in privity
with the General Assembly because redistricting is a “matter of public concern.”124
The Supreme Court disagreed, vacating the district court’s judgment.125 As in Exxon Mobil, the Court initially emphasized the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.126 It then emphasized that
Rooker-Feldman is independent from preclusion law.127 Rejecting the
Tenth Circuit’s privity analysis, the Court stated that “[t]he RookerFeldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier
state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law,
they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.”128
The doctrine did not apply in Lance because “plaintiffs were plainly
not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding.”129
Thus, Exxon Mobil and Lance clarified several aspects of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. First, the Rooker-Feldman analysis is
completely separate from preclusion law and the abstention doctrines.130 In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized in Lance that
“Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name.”131 Second, the doctrine applies only if the federal suit is filed after the state
court renders its judgment.132 In other words, Rooker-Feldman does
not bar federal suits that a party files while state court proceedings
122. Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (D. Colo. 2005), vacated, Lance,
546 U.S. at 467.
123. See id. (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has permitted the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine to be
used against parties who were in privity with parties to the original state-court suit.” (citing Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 481 (10th Cir. 2002), partial overruling
recognized by Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 n.10 (10th Cir. 2006))).
124. See id. at 1125.
125. Lance, 546 U.S. at 462-63. The Supreme Court reviewed the case under the statutory provision allowing direct appeals from decisions of three-judge district court panels.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006); Lance, 546 U.S. at 462-63.
126. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (“Neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated a rationale
for a wide-reaching bar on the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and our cases since
Feldman have tended to emphasize the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.” (citing
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005); Verizon Md., Inc.
v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994))).
127. Id. at 466.
128. Id. (footnote omitted).
129. Id. at 465.
130. See id. at 466; Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see also Rowe & Baskauskas, supra
note 27, at 17 (noting that federal courts should avoid “general resort to preclusion law
even as an aid in determining applicability of Rooker-Feldman”).
131. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 466.
132. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see id. at 293.
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are still ongoing.133 Finally, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable when the
federal plaintiff was not a party to the state suit.134 After Lance, privity is not enough in most cases.135
E. The Supreme Court Has Not Addressed Whether Rooker-Feldman
Protects State Court Interlocutory Orders
Even though Exxon Mobil and Lance clarified the scope of Rooker-Feldman, the Supreme Court did not specify which state court
“judgments” trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.136 In particular,
the Court did not address whether the doctrine applies only to final
state court judgments or also protects state court interlocutory orders.137 There is no doubt that Rooker-Feldman bars a federal district
court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over a final state court
judgment on the merits.138 But does Rooker-Feldman also prevent
federal district courts from reviewing stays, preliminary injunctions,
rulings on pretrial motions, discovery orders, and other interlocutory
decisions rendered by state courts?
There is no easy answer. None of the Supreme Court’s RookerFeldman decisions involve an attempt by a federal district court to
review a state court interlocutory order. One can interpret isolated
dicta from the Court’s opinions either way. The Feldman decision re133. See id. at 293-94.
134. Lance, 546 U.S. at 465.
135. Id. at 466. The Supreme Court qualified its holding in Lance, stating that “we
need not address whether there are any circumstances, however limited, in which RookerFeldman may be applied against a party not named in an earlier state proceeding,” and it
gave the example of an estate taking a de facto appeal in district court from an earlier
state court decision involving a decedent. Id. at 466 n.2.
136. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 21-23; Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 25, at 144.
137. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is also worth noting that after
Exxon Mobil and Lance, the role of the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry is uncertain as
well. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 3-4. Although Exxon Mobil mentioned the
language “inextricably intertwined” while giving background on the Feldman decision, see
544 U.S. at 286 & n.1, it played no role in the Court’s holding, id. at 293-94. Lance mentioned the phrase “inextricably intertwined” only while describing the flawed rationale of
the district court in that case. 546 U.S. at 462-63. Scholars disagree on whether the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry remains a meaningful part of the Rooker-Feldman analysis.
Compare Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 25, at 121 (“The Court [in Exxon
Mobil] appeared to abandon the ‘inextricably intertwined’ part of the doctrine.”), with
Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 11-12 (suggesting that the “inextricably intertwined” concept occupies a secondary role in the Rooker-Feldman analysis, but noting that
“we do not think it appropriate to conclude that the phrase can be entirely discarded”).
138. The Rooker decision itself confirms this. In Rooker, the federal suit challenged a
final state court judgment on the merits—the Indiana Supreme Court had previously affirmed the state trial court’s judgment that the trustee had a right to sell the Rookers’
property and distribute the proceeds under the terms of the contract. See Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923) (holding federal district court had no jurisdiction to
review Indiana Supreme Court’s judgment); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769,
773, 776 (Ind. 1921) (affirming trial court’s decision on the merits).
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fers to the doctrine as a bar against federal district court review of
“final” state court decisions.139 However, other language casts RookerFeldman as a more expansive prohibition against lower federal court
review of state court “judgments.”140
Contradictory language in Exxon Mobil exacerbates this problem.
In the first part of its opinion, the Court holds that Rooker-Feldman
bars federal suits filed “by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced.”141 Under this language, the doctrine conceivably protects interlocutory orders that a state court enters before
the commencement of a similar federal action.142 However, Exxon
Mobil later states that the Rooker and Feldman cases exhibit the limited circumstances in which the doctrine bars jurisdiction—“[i]n
both cases, the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court
after the state proceedings ended.”143 This language suggests that
Rooker-Feldman may protect only final state court judgments.144
Given the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s language, it
would be a mistake to overread Exxon Mobil as restricting RookerFeldman to final state court decisions.145 The Court did not define
when state court proceedings have “ended” for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,146 and the distinction between final and interlocutory state court orders was not at issue in the case.147 Indeed, the
decision itself notes that ExxonMobil filed suit in federal district
court “well before any judgment in state court.”148 Exxon Mobil simply

139. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (“The District of
Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without
authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
judicial proceedings.” (emphasis added)).
140. See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3
(2002) (noting that Rooker-Feldman “does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments” (emphasis added)); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (noting that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a party losing
in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the
state judgment in a United States district court” (emphasis added)); Rooker, 263 U.S. at
415 (“If the [state court] decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but
merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding.” (emphasis added)).
141. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added).
142. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22 (noting that “[a] state-court ‘judgment’ might be construed to include the likes of a grant of a preliminary injunction, which
could be viewed as a non-final judgment”).
143. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added).
144. Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22.
145. Id. at 22-23.
146. See Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 25, at 144.
147. Instead, the Court analyzed a fact pattern in which a state trial court judgment
was issued after the commencement of a suit in federal district court. See Exxon Mobil, 544
U.S. at 289.
148. Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
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holds that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when a litigant files suit
in federal court before the state court enters a judgment.149 It does not
address whether the doctrine bars federal suits filed after entry of
state court interlocutory orders.
In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally holds that federal
district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Exxon Mobil and Lance
provide clarification to some questions relating to the scope of the
doctrine. However, these decisions fail to indicate which state court
“judgments” trigger Rooker-Feldman, and the Court has not addressed whether the doctrine applies only to final state court judgments or also protects state court interlocutory orders. We must turn
elsewhere for an answer.
III. PURPOSE OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
Given the lack of clarity in existing case law, the best way to discern whether Rooker-Feldman protects state court interlocutory orders is to reason from the principles underlying the doctrine itself.150
There are three fundamental principles behind Rooker-Feldman.151
First, the doctrine enforces constitutional separation of powers and
the limited jurisdiction of federal courts.152 Second, Rooker-Feldman
advances interests of federalism by protecting state court judgments.153 Third, the doctrine recognizes that state courts are fully
competent to adjudicate federal claims.154
A. Rooker-Feldman Enforces Separation of Powers and the Limited
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
Courts have recognized that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
rooted in the principle of separation of powers.”155 Congress has ex149. Id.
150. Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22 (“Arguing from [Exxon Mobil’s] fine linguistic differences, . . . does not seem . . . to be a fruitful exercise. It makes sense instead to
start from a foundational principle undergirding Rooker-Feldman: the only federal court to
which Congress has given any statutory authority to review state-court judgments is the
Supreme Court.” (footnotes omitted)).
151. This analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. Commentators have cited other worthy purposes behind Rooker-Feldman. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 54, at 1350 (noting that
Rooker-Feldman protects “finality in the judicial system”); George L. Proctor et al., RookerFeldman and the Jurisdictional Quandary, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 113, 114 (2000) (recognizing that the doctrine “protect[s] the integrity of state court judgments”); Sherry, Judicial
Federalism, supra note 49, at 1117 (arguing that the doctrine is a “forum-shifting device”).
By examining the primary purposes behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Article aims
to contribute significantly to existing literature on the subject.
152. See infra Part III.A.
153. See infra Part III.B.
154. See infra Part III.C.
155. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000).
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clusive authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts,156 and those courts cannot hear a case unless Congress has affirmatively granted jurisdiction by statute.157 This principle has been
the driving force behind Rooker-Feldman since the Rooker decision
itself.158 The doctrine ensures that federal courts stay within the
boundaries of their limited statutory jurisdiction.159
It is important to stress the statutory nature of Rooker-Feldman.
Congressional legislation granting federal district courts appellate
jurisdiction over state court judgments almost certainly would be
within the constitutional limitations of Article III. When Alexander
Hamilton discussed the constitutional limitations of federal judicial
power in The Federalist, he perceived “no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state courts to the subordinate
national tribunals.”160 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits cite this language
as evidence that Rooker-Feldman is a statutory limitation, rather
than a constitutional requirement.161 In other words, Congress
could pass a statute granting lower federal courts appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, which would abolish the RookerFeldman doctrine.
But Congress has not done so. Although the Judiciary Act of 1789
created lower federal courts and defined their jurisdiction, “they were
not given any power to review directly cases from state courts, and
they have not been given such powers since that time.”162 The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 is clear: only the U.S. Supreme Court may
review state court judgments.163 The grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.

156. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850); Bandes, supra note 16, at 1189.
157. Robert B. Funkhouser et al., Comment, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power over State Court Proceedings, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
767, 774 (1986).
158. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (“Under the legislation
of Congress, no court of the United States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that character. . . . The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
159. See Chang, supra note 54, at 1349 (“The federal district courts, as courts of limited
jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction which Congress determines is appropriate. Congress has yet to give the lower federal courts jurisdiction to review state court judgments.”
(citation omitted)); Rebecca Schmucker, Possible Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to State Agency Decisions: The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Van Harken v. City of
Chicago, 17 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 333, 333 (1997) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
is an extension of the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . .”).
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
161. See Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006); In re
Meyerland Co., 910 F.2d 1257, 1261 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990).
162. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970).
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by writ of certiorari . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335
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§ 1331 is equally clear: federal district courts can only exercise “original jurisdiction,” not appellate jurisdiction.164
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine keeps lower federal courts from
straying outside these statutory boundaries. Because the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to expand federal court jurisdiction, it would be wholly inappropriate for courts to do so on their
own initiative.165 As Professor Williamson Chang argues, “[s]uch a delicate issue of fundamental federal-state relations must be left to a
representative forum, such as Congress, where the justifications for
state judicial sovereignty can be fully represented.”166 Entrusting
Congress with decisions regarding federal court jurisdiction is not only a good idea—it is constitutionally mandated.167 Thus, the RookerFeldman doctrine enforces separation of powers and recognizes that
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
B. Rooker-Feldman Preserves Federalism by Preventing Lower
Federal Courts from Reviewing State Court Judgments
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is also based on principles of federalism.168 Loosely defined, “federalism” is a system which divides sovereignty between two or more political units, each of which governs

(“Because Congress gave only the Supreme Court the explicit right to review the decisions
of a state court, Congress meant to deny all other federal courts that power.”).
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” (emphasis added)); see also Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“Congress has empowered the federal district courts to exercise only original jurisdiction.”
(quoting Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000))); McLain,
supra note 19, at 1572 n.111 (“If a district court lacks appellate jurisdiction under §
1331 . . . , then clearly it cannot hear ‘appeals’ from lower state courts.”). But see Beermann, supra note 10, at 1229 (arguing that Rooker-Feldman misinterprets § 1331, which is
“permissive, not restrictive” and that “[s]ection 1331’s use of the word ‘original’ should be
understood merely to direct plaintiffs to the proper court to file their cases”).
165. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 16, at 1189 (“Congress has the responsibility for determining the precise contours of federal jurisdiction and Rooker-Feldman is premised on
the notion that Congress has defined those contours, through 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and § 1331,
to preclude lower federal courts from hearing appeals from state court decisions.” (footnote
omitted)); Chang, supra note 54, at 1376 (“Just as the lower federal courts may not on their
own enlarge their jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may not, without congressional permission, share its exclusive jurisdiction with the lower courts.” (citation omitted)).
166. Chang, supra note 54, at 1376.
167. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 7-9 (describing the “Madisonian Compromise,” in which the Constitutional Convention agreed that Congress would have the power
to create lower federal courts).
168. See, e.g., Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th
Cir. 1997)); Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at 198; Chang, supra note 54, at 1341; Schmucker, supra note 159, at 336; Benjamin Smith, Note, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a
Crude Analysis of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 627, 636 (1987); Blake A. Snider, Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Ignores Principles of Federalism and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc), 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 881, 893 (1998).
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the same populace.169 As Justice Anthony Kennedy notes, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution “split the atom of sovereignty” by creating a system in which “our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other.”170 In other words, the basis for the concept of federalism is the
coexistence of two sovereign entities and the competing concerns of
state and federal power.
The derivative concept of judicial federalism recognizes the independence and sovereignty of the state and federal court systems.171
State and federal courts are separate legal systems that proceed independently of each other, with ultimate review in the U.S. Supreme
Court.172 As one federal circuit court bluntly stated, “[j]udicial errors
committed in state courts are for correction in the state court systems, at the head of which stands the United States Supreme Court;
such errors are no business of ours.”173 State courts have a long tradition of jealously guarding their independence.174
Assertion of jurisdiction and entry of judgment by a court are exercises of sovereign power,175 and tension arises when lower federal
courts intrude upon the sovereignty and independence of state
courts. This tension is inevitable to some extent because state and
federal courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over many claims.176
169. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11
(1964) (“A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and
people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3)
there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.”).
170. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
171. See, e.g., Sherry, Judicial Federalism, supra note 49, at 1085 (“Judicial federalism
is the aggregation of issues arising from the existence of two sets of American courts, state
and federal.”).
172. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970).
173. Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1986).
174. Professor Chang makes this observation:
Today, when refiling a claim in federal court may be almost an automatic response to an unsatisfactory state court result, it is easy to forget how reluctantly the states acquiesced to any federal review of state court judgments. The
power of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions, first challenged in
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, has been attacked repeatedly.
Chang, supra note 54, at 1345 (footnotes omitted).
175. Id. at 1375 (“The effect of allowing the lower federal courts to act as the appellate
courts of the state not only contravenes the statutory grants of jurisdiction to the federal
courts but undermines state judicial sovereignty.”).
176. For example, federal courts can entertain state-law claims when the parties are
citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (allowing federal district courts to
exercise diversity jurisdiction); see also James William Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1964) (“The traditional view is that diversity jurisdiction was established to provide a forum for the determination of controversies between citizens of different states which would be free from lo-
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However, our dual judicial system would cease to function “if state
and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case.”177 Congress was well aware of this inherent tension, and
it passed jurisdictional statutes establishing “lines of demarcation
between the two systems.”178
Rooker-Feldman enforces one of these lines of demarcation. The
doctrine preserves the delicate balance of judicial federalism by preventing lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.179
Rooker-Feldman “ensures that the federal and state systems remain
sovereign, with the Supreme Court the sole federal court with the
power to rule on federal questions raised in either forum.”180 Thus, at
its core the doctrine is “an obligatory, statutorily-based expression of
federalism”181 that recognizes the “competing concerns of state judicial sovereignty and federal power.”182
C. Rooker-Feldman Recognizes that State Courts Are
Fully Competent to Adjudicate Federal Claims
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also acknowledges that state courts
are just as capable of deciding federal claims as federal courts.183
Scholars often describe this concept as “parity” between state and
federal courts.184 Several Supreme Court cases—including Feldman
itself—emphasize that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate

cal prejudice or influence.”). State courts also are fully competent to adjudicate federal
claims. See infra Part III.C.
177. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“Rooker-Feldman . . . preserves a fundamental tenet in our system of federalism that . . .
appellate review of state court decisions occurs first within the state appellate system and
then in the United States Supreme Court.” (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th
Cir. 1997))); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Rooker-Feldman is one of a number of doctrines that safeguards our dual system of government
from federal judicial erosion.” (citing Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286)).
180. Bandes, supra note 16, at 1184 (citing David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 323 (1978)).
181. Chang, supra note 54, at 1341 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 1337.
183. See, e.g., id. at 1366; Schmucker, supra note 159, at 336; Smith, supra note 168, at
636. But see Bandes, supra note 16, at 1187 (stating that “Rooker-Feldman conflicts with
other jurisdictional mandates . . . which reflect a congressional judgment that state court
vehicles for the vindication of federal rights and interests are inadequate.” (footnote omitted)).
184. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 322-26 (discussing the parity of
state and federal courts and citing empirical studies and academic literature on the topic);
see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 233 n.1 (1988) (defining parity as “whether, overall, state
courts are equal to federal courts in their ability and willingness to protect federal constitutional rights”).
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federal constitutional issues.185 In Stone v. Powell,186 the Court noted
that “[s]tate courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.”187
Endorsing the concept of parity, the Court said it was “unwilling to
assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity
to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the
several States.”188
Proponents of expansive federal court jurisdiction contest this assumption and argue that state courts underenforce federal rights.189
Professor Burt Neuborne advances three reasons why federal courts
generally are more sympathetic to federal claims.190 First, the federal
judiciary supposedly attracts judges with greater technical competence because the position is better paid and more prestigious.191
Second, “[a]s heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement, federal judges feel subtle, yet nonetheless real pressures to uphold that
tradition.”192 Third, the life tenure of federal judges insulates them
from “majoritarian pressures,” allowing them “to enforce the Constitution without fear of reprisal.”193
Advocates of parity respond with two arguments. First, the structure of Article III suggests that parity is an indispensable concept in
our federal system, if not constitutionally mandated.194 The Constitution gave Congress complete discretion to establish (or not establish)
lower federal courts.195 From this premise, scholars have argued that

185. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1988) (“[W]hen a
state proceeding presents a federal issue, . . . the proper course is to seek resolution of that
issue by the state court.”); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (rejecting the
“assumption that the States cannot be trusted to enforce federal rights with adequate diligence” as “inappropriate” (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976))); D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16 (1983) (“We have noted the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims.” (citing Sumner v. Mata,
449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Swain v. Pressley, 430
U.S. 372, 383 (1977))).
186. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
187. Id. at 494 n.35 (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
341-44 (1816)).
188. Id.
189. Chemerinsky, supra note 184, at 233-34 (citations omitted).
190. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1121-28 (1977);
see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 323-24 (summarizing Neuborne’s analysis).
191. See Neuborne, supra note 190, at 1121-22.
192. Id. at 1124.
193. Id. at 1127 (citation omitted).
194. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 325-26.
195. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Congress may
withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies.
Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”); see also FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 160, at 401 (concluding “that the
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“[s]ince Congress need not create any lower federal courts at all, Article III must be indifferent whether adjudication occurs in state or
federal court.”196 Thus, the Constitution seems to assume that parity
exists between state and federal courts on matters of federal law.197
Second, several empirical studies suggest that there is no meaningful
difference between state and federal courts when it comes to the adjudication of federal claims.198
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine relies heavily on the concept of parity. By prohibiting lower federal court interference with state court
judgments, the doctrine assumes that state courts will fully and fairly adjudicate federal claims.199 Proponents of Rooker-Feldman argue
that state appellate courts “have a record equal to that of the federal
courts in protecting constitutional rights.”200 Ultimately, when errors
are made in either the state or federal court systems, discretionary
review by the U.S. Supreme Court is available,201 even if it is rare in
either case.
In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine advances the important interests of separation of powers, federalism, and parity, and courts
analyzing unanswered questions about the doctrine’s scope should
reason from these underlying principles. Unfortunately, federal
courts have not always made this inquiry. As Professor Susan
Bandes notes, “Courts have too often used the jurisdictional stature
of the doctrine as a convenient way to avoid reasoning through the
policies underlying it.”202 As we shall see, nowhere is this more apparent than the current split among federal circuit courts as to
whether Rooker-Feldman protects state court interlocutory orders.
organs of the national judiciary should be one supreme court and as many subordinate
courts as congress should think proper to appoint”).
196. FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 325-26.
197. See FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 160, at 402 (“[T]he inference seems to be conclusive that the state courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in
all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was not expressly prohibited.”). Indeed, the presumption that state courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims is further supported by the fact that Congress did not grant statutory federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts until 1875. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 828-29.
198. See, e.g., Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of
State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 238-39 (1999); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker,
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial
Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214-15 (1983). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 184,
at 273 (suggesting that “[a]lthough parity is an empirical question, no empirical answer
seems possible”).
199. See Schmucker, supra note 159, at 336; Smith, supra note 168, at 636.
200. Chang, supra note 54, at 1366 (footnote omitted).
201. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006) (providing that the Supreme
Court may review cases from the federal court of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (providing that the Supreme Court may review final state court judgments on federal claims).
202. Bandes, supra note 16, at 1192.
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IV. CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER ROOKER-FELDMAN PROTECTS
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
The circuits are split on whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars suits in lower federal courts that challenge state court interlocutory orders.203 The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use
a narrow approach, applying Rooker-Feldman only to final state
court judgments.204 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits use a broad approach, extending Rooker-Feldman to
all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders.205 The First,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits use an intermediate approach, applying Rooker-Feldman to some—but not all—state court interlocutory orders.206
A. The Narrow Approach: Rooker-Feldman Does Not Extend to State
Court Interlocutory Orders
The Fifth,207 Seventh,208 and Eleventh209 Circuits have held that
Rooker-Feldman protects only final state court judgments.210 In these
203. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 21 (“Federal courts have been somewhat divided about whether Rooker-Feldman can bar lower federal-court jurisdiction when
a state court has made an interlocutory ruling, such as granting a preliminary injunction.”); Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 25, at 144 (“[L]ower courts are struggling to define the ‘end’ of state-court proceedings. . . . [and] have, understandably, reached
a variety of inconsistent conclusions.” (citation omitted)).
204. See infra Part IV.A.
205. See infra Part IV.B.
206. See infra Part IV.C. This Article intentionally does not classify the approach used
by courts within the Third Circuit because application of Rooker-Feldman to state court interlocutory orders has been inconsistent. Compare Warren v. Baker, No. 4:07-cv-188, 2007
WL 2264099, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2007) (holding that Rooker-Feldman barred federal
claim challenging a state court interlocutory ruling on a party’s preliminary objections),
with RegScan, Inc. v. Brewer, No. Civ.A. 04-6043, 2005 WL 874662, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
13, 2005) (holding that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable after federal plaintiff argued that
“Rooker-Feldman should not apply” to an “interlocutory and procedural” state court judgment).
207. See, e.g., In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (limiting RookerFeldman to final state court judgments). But see, e.g., Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691
(5th Cir. 1986) (“We hold no warrant to review even final judgments of state courts, let
alone those which may never take final effect because they remain subject to revision in
the state appellate system.”).
208. See, e.g., TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); Brown
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2:07-CV-221 PS, 2008 WL 711721, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar.
13, 2008).
209. See, e.g., Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11
(11th Cir. 2003) (providing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires a “prior state court
ruling [that] was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits”); see also Siegel v. Lepore,
234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (“No party has called to our attention any final judgments in the Florida state courts upon which a Rooker-Feldman bar reasonably could
be based . . . .”).
210. Courts in other circuits occasionally have applied this narrow rule as well. See,
e.g., H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that abstention principles rather than Rooker-Feldman apply when there are ongoing state proceedings and no final state court judgment (citation omitted)); RegScan, 2005 WL 874662,
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circuits, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent federal district courts from exercising de facto appellate jurisdiction over state
court interlocutory orders,211 nor does it protect state court judgments
that are either subject to modification212 or appealable in state
court.213 The Eleventh Circuit even requires a final state court judgment on the merits before it will consider Rooker-Feldman.214
Two rationales support this narrow approach. First, some argue
that Rooker-Feldman should protect only those final state court
judgments that are reviewable by the Supreme Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1257.215 Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself arose
from judicial interpretation of § 1257,216 “denying jurisdiction based
on a state court judgment that is not eligible for review by the United
States Supreme Court simply would not follow from the jurisdictional
statute that invigorated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the first
place.”217 Thus, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is only necessary to effectuate the negative implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257—it is needed
only to prevent lower federal courts from considering cases that the

at *1-3 (refusing to apply Rooker-Feldman, despite a prior state court interlocutory order
denying party’s motion to amend complaint).
211. See, e.g., TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591 (stating that because Rooker-Feldman only applies after the state proceedings ended, “an interlocutory ruling does not evoke the doctrine
or preclude federal jurisdiction”); Main St. Bank & Trust v. Saltonstall, No. 06-1114, 2006
WL 2385274, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2006) (“[A]n interlocutory state court order does not
evoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the state court proceedings are still pending.”
(citing TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591)).
212. See In re Hodges, 350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (stating that although
state court had entered a judgment of foreclosure prior to the federal suit, Rooker-Feldman
did not preclude federal jurisdiction because the foreclosure judgment was modifiable by
the trial court until the sale was confirmed).
213. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The state case
was on appeal to the Louisiana appellate court. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
is inapplicable.”); In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that
Rooker-Feldman did not apply because “[t]wo higher courts within the state judiciary could
hear appeals” of the state court judgment).
214. The Eleventh Circuit applies Rooker-Feldman only if four conditions are met, including the requirement that “the prior state court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits.” Amos, 347 F.3d at 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003). Eleventh Circuit decisions after Exxon Mobil continue to use the Amos test. See, e.g., Burt Dev. Co. v. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 230 F. App’x 910, 912-13 (11th Cir. 2007); Morris v. Wroble, 206 F. App’x 915,
918 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2006); Force v. Kolhage, 198 F. App’x 827, 829 (11th Cir. 2006); Herskowitz v. Reid, 187 F. App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2006); Ransom v. Georgia, 181 F. App’x
776, 777 (11th Cir. 2006).
215. See, e.g., In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d at 516.
216. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1976)); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923) (interpreting
the statutory antecedent to § 1257); see also Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note
25, at 144 (“Rooker-Feldman is derived from an interpretation of § 1257, which reserves to
the Supreme Court the right to review state-court judgments . . . .”).
217. Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000), abrogated by Federación de
Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 27-28 (1st
Cir. 2005).
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Supreme Court is permitted to hear under the statute.”218 The Fifth
Circuit relies on this reasoning.219
Second, courts cite language from Exxon Mobil for the proposition
that Rooker-Feldman is limited to federal suits that are filed “after
the state proceedings ended”220—in other words, federal suits challenging final state court judgments.221 As noted above, the Supreme
Court stated in Exxon Mobil that the Rooker and Feldman cases
demonstrate the rare circumstances in which the doctrine bars jurisdiction.222 The Court noted that “[i]n both cases, the losing party in
state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings
ended.”223 Although this language from Exxon Mobil is pure dictum,224
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits nonetheless give it binding effect and
refuse to apply Rooker-Feldman unless state proceedings have
ground to a complete halt.225

218. Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (summarizing appellant’s argument before rejecting it).
219. See In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d at 516 (implying that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable unless there is a “final state court judgment[]” under § 1257 (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The First Circuit also initially tied the scope of RookerFeldman to appealability under § 1257. See Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21 n.5; Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1999). However, the First Circuit changed course after
Exxon Mobil and stated that appealability under § 1257 was no longer necessary to trigger
Rooker-Feldman. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 26-27.
220. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005).
221. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006); TruServ Corp. v.
Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d at 591 (7th Cir. 2005).
222. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. As noted earlier in this Article, there were absolutely no state court interlocutory
orders at issue in Exxon Mobil. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22 (“Arguing
from these kinds of fine linguistic differences, in an opinion in which the Court was not focusing on the final-versus-interlocutory distinction, does not seem to us to be a fruitful exercise.”). Indeed, when the Court did hold that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable, it merely
noted that ExxonMobil had filed its federal suit “well before any judgment in state court.”
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added).
225. See, e.g., Rowley, 200 F. App’x at 275 (“Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court
judgment is sufficiently final for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state
proceedings [have] ended.’ ” (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291) (alteration in original));
TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591 (“The doctrine only applies to cases like Rooker and Feldman
where ‘the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings
ended . . . .’ ” (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291)).
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B. The Broad Approach: Rooker-Feldman Protects State Court
Interlocutory Orders
The Second,226 Fourth,227 Sixth,228 and District of Columbia229 Circuits extend the protection of Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory orders
and decisions by lower state courts.230 Courts within these circuits
have applied this broad approach even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil.231 As a result, Rooker-Feldman has been used
to prevent federal collateral attacks on a variety of state court
interlocutory orders, including stays,232 preliminary injunctions,233
preliminary orders,234 rulings on pretrial motions,235 and
discovery orders.236
Several arguments support this broad approach. First, some
courts reject the premise that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies

226. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 138 (2d Cir. 1997); Campbell v.
Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996); Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir.
1995); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other
grounds 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
227. See Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003); Brown &
Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000); Jordahl v. Democratic Party
of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). But see Martin v. Ball, Civil Action No. 5:06CV85,
2008 WL 2120931, at *7 (N.D.W. Va. May 20, 2008) (applying an intermediate approach
(citing Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d
17, 24 (1st Cir. 2005))).
228. See Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003).
229. See Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
230. Before Exxon Mobil, the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits also held that
Rooker-Feldman protected state court interlocutory orders and lower state court decisions.
See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003); Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union,
314 F.3d 468, 474-75 (10th Cir. 2002), abrogation recognized by Guttman v. Khalsa, 446
F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006); Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026,
1030 (9th Cir. 2001); Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990). These circuits abandoned the broad approach after Exxon Mobil. See supra Part IV.A and infra
Part IV.C.
231. E.g., Vizgrand, Inc. v. Supervalue Holding, Inc., No. 07-13430-BC, 2007 WL
2413102, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2007); Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Morrison, 496 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 685 n.11 (E.D. Va. 2007); Hann v. Michigan, No. 05-CV-71347-DT, 2007 WL
892413, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2007); Field Auto City, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 476 F.
Supp. 2d 545, 553 (E.D. Va. 2007); Galtieri v. Kelly, 441 F. Supp. 2d 447, 458 n.9 (E.D.N.Y.
2006); Sinclair v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 5:05-CV-072, 2005 WL 3434827, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 13, 2005). But see Phillips ex rel. Green v. City of New York, 453 F. Supp. 2d
690, 714-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
232. E.g., Pieper, 336 F.3d at 459, 464-65 (order staying litigation pending arbitration);
Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 319-20 (denial of motion to stay judicial proceedings).
233. E.g., Kenmen, 314 F.3d at 473-75 (grant of temporary and permanent injunctions).
234. E.g., Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1995) (sua sponte order disqualifying attorneys from representing clients due to ethical constraints).
235. E.g., Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 2005) (denial of motion for recusal); Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 319-20 (denial of motion to compel arbitration); Brown & Root,
Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2000) (denial of motion to compel arbitration).
236. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1990) (grant of motion to
compel production of documents during discovery).
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only when Supreme Court review is available under § 1257.237 For
example, the Sixth Circuit reasons that “the statement that lower
federal courts should not have jurisdiction where the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine) does not logically imply that lower federal courts should always have jurisdiction when the
Supreme Court does not.”238 If anything, “a natural reading of 28
U.S.C. § 1257 suggests that no federal court (neither inferior nor Supreme) has jurisdiction over appeals from non-final state-court orders
or from orders and decisions of lower state courts.”239
Second, courts applying a broad rule note that Rooker-Feldman’s
purpose is intertwined with principles of federalism,240 parity,241 and
judicial economy.242 Under this rationale, the doctrine recognizes that
“state courts are just as obligated and competent as federal courts to
decide federal constitutional questions.”243 Additionally, courts reason
that “a path is available through the state appellate system to the
Supreme Court” under the existing federal structure.244 Finally, these
courts emphasize that the doctrine avoids “waste of judicial resources
and unnecessary friction between state and federal courts [that]
might ensue if a federal district court intervened to overrule a state
court decision.”245
C. The Intermediate Approach: Rooker-Feldman Protects Some (but
Not All) State Court Interlocutory Orders
The First,246 Eighth,247 Ninth,248 and Tenth249 Circuits follow an
intermediate approach, extending Rooker-Feldman to some—but not
237. E.g., Pieper, 336 F.3d at 462; Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d
1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).
238. Pieper, 336 F.3d at 464; accord Doe & Assocs. Law Offices, 252 F.3d at 1030
(“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not premised on the availability of Supreme Court review of the state court decision.”).
239. Pieper, 336 F.3d at 464 n.5 (emphasis added); see also 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469.1, at 146-47 (2d ed. 2002) (“Of course
the prospect that there may never be Supreme Court jurisdiction may support the further
conclusion that district court subject-matter jurisdiction is even less appropriate.”).
240. See, e.g., Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th
Cir. 1997)).
241. See, e.g., Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000);
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds 481
U.S. 1 (1987).
242. See, e.g., Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1142.
243. Id. (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975)).
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281,
286 (1970)).
246. See Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R.,
410 F.3d 17, 23-25 (1st Cir. 2005).
247. See Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Federación
test). But see Friends of Eudora Pub. Sch. Dist. of Chicot County v. Beebe, No. 5:06CV0044
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all—state court interlocutory orders. This approach has its origins in
Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del
Trabajo de Puerto Rico,250 a First Circuit case decided less than two
months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil.251
Federación involved a suit in federal district court challenging an
interlocutory judgment by the Puerto Rico appellate courts.252 A labor
union had filed an unfair labor practices grievance before the Puerto
Rico Labor Relations Board against an employer.253 The employer
moved to dismiss, contending that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the National Labor Relations Act preempted Puerto Rico labor
law.254 After the Board denied the motion, the employer unsuccessfully appealed the interlocutory order in the Puerto Rico courts.255 Undeterred, the employer filed suit in federal district court, seeking “an
injunction ordering the Board to terminate its proceedings for lack of
jurisdiction.”256 The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.257 Although the employer argued
that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to interlocutory orders,258 the
First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.259
In its analysis, the First Circuit started from the premise that
“Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final
for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state proceedings [have] ended.’ ”260 Elaborating on the meaning of this dictum
from Exxon Mobil, the court held that state proceedings have “ended”

SWW, 2008 WL 828360, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 25, 2008) (stating that Rooker-Feldman applies to interlocutory orders, without mentioning intermediate approach from Federación).
248. See Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir.
2005) (applying Federación test).
249. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying Federación test). But see Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The state condemnation proceeding need not be final in order to serve as grounds for Rooker-Feldman
preclusion.” (citing Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 474 (10th Cir. 2002)));
Stubblefield v. Egelhoff, No. 08-cv-00619-BNB, 2008 WL 2011865, at *2 (D. Colo. May 8,
2008) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars review not only of final judgments entered by
state courts, but also of their interlocutory orders.” (citing Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000))).
250. 410 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005).
251. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 280 (2005) (decided March 30, 2005); Federación, 410 F.3d at 17 (decided May 27, 2005).
252. Federación, 410 F.3d at 19-20.
253. Id. at 19.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 19-20.
256. Id. at 20.
257. Federación de Maestros de P.R., Inc. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R.,
265 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188-89 (D.P.R. 2003).
258. Federación, 410 F.3d at 20.
259. Id. at 29.
260. Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)).
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under Rooker-Feldman in three situations.261 First, state proceedings
have ended “when the highest state court in which review is available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved.”262 In other words, Rooker-Feldman undoubtedly applies when
there is a final state court judgment under § 1257.263 Second, state
proceedings have ended “if the state action has reached a point where
neither party seeks further action”264 For example, Rooker-Feldman
applies when the losing party does not timely appeal a lower state
court judgment, even though the judgment may not be sufficiently final to trigger Supreme Court review under § 1257.265 Third, state
proceedings have ended when they “have finally resolved all the federal questions in the litigation, but state law or purely factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be litigated.”266 This third
situation relies on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.267 In Cox Broadcasting, the Supreme Court outlined four situations in which nonfinal state court judgments are considered “final” for purposes of § 1257
because all federal issues have been resolved.268 The First Circuit applied this test to the facts of Federación and held that Rooker-

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 25.
267. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
268. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 25-27 & n.11. Cox Broadcasting outlined four situations in which nonfinal state court judgments nonetheless qualify as “final” judgments for
Supreme Court review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006):
In the first category are those cases in which there are further proceedings—
even entire trials—yet to occur in the state courts but where for one reason or
another the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings
preordained. . . .
Second, there are cases . . . in which the federal issue, finally decided by the
highest court in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the
outcome of future state-court proceedings. . . .
In the third category are those situations where the federal claim has been
finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever
the ultimate outcome of the case. . . .
....
Lastly, there are those situations where the federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts with further proceedings pending in which the party
seeking review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus
rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further
litigation on the relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling the nature and character of, or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state
proceedings still to come. . . . [And,] a refusal immediately to review the statecourt decision might seriously erode federal policy . . . .
Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 479-83.
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Feldman barred the employer’s federal suit because the Puerto Rico
judgment fell within one of the Cox Broadcasting situations.269
Two rationales support Federación’s intermediate approach.
First, the First Circuit repeatedly emphasizes that a state court proceeding can “end” under Exxon Mobil even when the Supreme Court
does not have appellate jurisdiction under § 1257.270 This echoes the
rationale of circuits that use the broad approach.271 Second, the First
Circuit gives binding effect to Exxon Mobil’s dictum that state proceedings must have “ended” for Rooker-Feldman to apply.272 This
mirrors the rationale of those circuits that use the narrow approach.273 Federación resolves any tension between these two rationales by stating that “appealability under § 1257 is not necessary to
satisfy the Exxon Mobil ‘ended’ test, [but] it will almost always be
sufficient.”274 In other words, “if a state court decision is final enough
that the Supreme Court does have jurisdiction over a direct appeal,
then it is final enough that a lower federal court does not have jurisdiction over a collateral attack on that decision.”275
In sum, the circuits are split on whether Rooker-Feldman bars
federal suits challenging state court interlocutory orders. Circuits using the narrow approach apply Rooker-Feldman only to final state
court judgments. Circuits using the broad approach extend the doctrine to all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. Circuits using the intermediate approach apply Rooker-Feldman to
some—but not all—state court interlocutory orders.

269. Federación, 410 F.3d at 28-29.
270. See id. at 24 (holding that, under Federación’s second situation, a proceeding has
“ended” under Exxon Mobil “if the state action has reached a point where neither party
seeks further action,” even though it may not be an appealable final judgment under
§ 1257); id. at 26 (“[W]e hasten to repeat that a proceeding may have ‘ended’ under Exxon
Mobil even when § 1257 jurisdiction would not have been available.”).
271. E.g., Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe
& Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).
272. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 24 (“Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court judgment
is sufficiently final for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state proceedings [have] ended.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005))).
273. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Exxon Mobil
tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final for operation of the RookerFeldman doctrine: when ‘the state proceedings [have] ended.’ ” (alteration in original)
(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291)); TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591
(7th Cir. 2005) (“The doctrine only applies to cases like Rooker and Feldman where ‘the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended . . . .’ ”
(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291)).
274. Federación, 410 F.3d at 26-27.
275. Id. at 27.
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V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT ROOKER-FELDMAN
PROTECTS STATE COURT INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
When an appropriate case presents itself, the Supreme Court
should resolve the split in circuit authority by holding that RookerFeldman extends to all state court judgments, including interlocutory
orders. Under this interpretation, the doctrine would prohibit federal
district courts from exercising de facto appellate jurisdiction over
state court preliminary injunctions, stays, rulings on pretrial motions, discovery orders, and other interlocutory decisions.276 The
Court should adopt this broad approach because it is the only rule
that is consistent with the fundamental purposes underlying the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. First, the broad approach requires lower
federal courts to enforce separation of powers by staying within the
boundaries of their limited statutory jurisdiction.277 Second, the broad
approach advances principles of federalism by requiring litigants to
seek appellate review of state court decisions in the state court system.278 Third, the broad approach recognizes that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate federal claims.279
A. Extending Rooker-Feldman to State Court Interlocutory Orders
Ensures Separation of Powers by Keeping Lower Federal Courts
Within Their Limited Jurisdictional Role
The most important reason why lower federal courts should not
exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory
orders is that Congress has not given explicit authority for such jurisdiction.280 The Constitution entrusts Congress with the exclusive
power to set the jurisdictional boundaries of the lower federal

276. See supra Part IV.B.
277. See infra Part V.A.
278. See infra Part V.B.
279. See infra Part V.C.
280. See, e.g., Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“ ‘Congress has empowered the federal district courts to exercise only original jurisdiction.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199
(4th Cir. 2000))); Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 464 n.5 (6th Cir.
2003) (“[A] natural reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 suggests that no federal court (neither inferior nor Supreme) has jurisdiction over appeals from non-final state-court orders.” (emphasis added)); Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335 (“Because Congress gave only the Supreme
Court the explicit right to review the decisions of a state court, Congress meant to deny all
other federal courts that power.”).
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courts.281 As a result, “[f]ederal district courts have no power to hear
a case unless expressly authorized to do so.”282
The Supreme Court currently is the only federal court with the
authority to exercise any jurisdiction over state court judgments.283
Congress has granted the Supreme Court limited jurisdiction over
certain state court judgments—specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1257,
“[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had” that involve a federal question.284
Because this grant of jurisdiction is limited to the Supreme Court,
lower federal courts “possess no power whatever to sit in direct review
of state court decisions.”285
This conclusion is further supported by Congress’ limited grant of
“original” jurisdiction to federal district courts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. Professor Chang notes that “[a]s used in the statutes, the
term ‘original’ jurisdiction is employed in direct contrast to ‘appellate’
jurisdiction.”286 Because Congress did not expressly grant appellate
jurisdiction to federal district courts, those courts simply lack jurisdiction to review state court decisions, regardless of whether the
state court decisions are final judgments or interlocutory orders.
The narrow and intermediate approaches—which allow lower
federal courts to review some or all state court interlocutory orders—
misinterpret these jurisdictional statutes and violate the constitutional separation of powers. Both approaches mistakenly allow federal district courts to exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over some
or all state court interlocutory orders,287 even though Congress has
granted no such jurisdiction.288 The narrow approach’s error is
rooted in its overly restrictive interpretation of Rooker-Feldman, un-

281. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Atl. Coast Line
R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 285 (1970); Bandes, supra note 16, at
1189; Chang, supra note 54, at 1376.
282. Funkhouser et al., supra note 157, at 774; accord Chang, supra note 54, at 1349
(“The federal district courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction
which Congress determines is appropriate.”).
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). There are only a few circumstances in which Congress has expressly conveyed jurisdiction upon lower federal courts to review state court
judgments. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548, 549, 727, 1129, 1141, 1325, 1328 (2006)
(federal bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to avoid, modify, and discharge certain state
court judgments); 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006) (federal district courts have jurisdiction to review Indian child custody proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (federal district courts
have jurisdiction over state prisoners’ habeas corpus petitions in certain circumstances).
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
285. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added).
286. Chang, supra note 54, at 1346.
287. See, e.g., Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006); Dornheim v.
Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2005); TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584,
591 (7th Cir. 2005); Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11
(11th Cir. 2003).
288. See Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286; Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335.
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der which the doctrine protects only “final” state court judgments
that are reviewable by the Supreme Court under § 1257.289 In other
words, courts using the narrow approach presume that federal district courts have jurisdiction over suits challenging state court judgments unless the judgment qualifies for Supreme Court review.
This assumption is irrational because it implies that “the Supreme Court’s lack of jurisdiction essentially ‘creates’ jurisdiction for
the lower federal courts.”290 Under well-established principles, lower
federal courts cannot hear a case unless Congress affirmatively
grants jurisdiction by statute.291 The idea that federal district courts
somehow automatically have jurisdiction over cases that the Supreme Court cannot hear turns this principle on its head.292 If anything, the absence of Supreme Court jurisdiction over most state
court interlocutory orders means that federal district court jurisdiction is “even less appropriate.”293
Although the intermediate approach recognizes this flaw in the
narrow approach, it nonetheless errs by falling prey to the seductive
song of Exxon Mobil’s dictum. In Federación, the First Circuit held
that Rooker-Feldman bars federal district courts from reviewing
some state court judgments that are not appealable under § 1257.294
However, the Federación Court erred by assuming that Exxon Mobil
restricts the doctrine to cases in which “ ‘the state proceedings [have]
ended.’ ”295 Reliance on this dictum led the First Circuit astray. Under Federación’s intermediate approach, federal district courts can
exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory
orders, except in those rare situations when the state action grinds to

289. See, e.g., In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992).
290. Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 2003).
291. Funkhouser et al., supra note 157, at 774; see also Keene Corp. v. United States,
508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
292. See Pieper, 336 F.3d at 464 (noting that a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court “does not logically imply that lower federal courts should always have jurisdiction when the Supreme Court does not”).
293. 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 239, § 4469.1, at 146-47; accord Pieper, 336 F.3d at
463 (“The Supreme Court’s lack of jurisdiction . . . seems . . . actually to be a stronger argument against lower federal-court jurisdiction than in favor of it.”).
294. See Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R.,
410 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that “a proceeding may have ‘ended’ under Exxon
Mobil even when § 1257 jurisdiction would not have been available”); id. at 26-27 (stating
that “appealability under § 1257 is not necessary to satisfy the Exxon Mobil ‘ended’ test,
[but] it will almost always be sufficient”).
295. Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)); see also Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th
Cir. 2006); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir.
2005). As noted above, this language from Exxon Mobil is pure dictum. See supra Part II.E.
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a complete halt or the state judgment is sufficiently “final” to qualify
for Supreme Court review under § 1257.296
This intermediate approach is nothing more than old wine in new
bottles. Federación offers a more nuanced analysis,297 but its effect is
virtually the same as the narrow approach—the vast majority of
state court interlocutory orders are subject to appellate review in federal district court, even though Congress has not granted such jurisdiction. Instead of reasoning from established jurisdictional principles—under which Congress alone has the power to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts298—the intermediate approach
offers a convoluted analysis, based on Supreme Court dictum, which
ultimately allows federal district courts to stray outside of the enumerated statutory authority authorized by Congress.
The bottom line is that, subject to a few exceptions, Congress has
not granted federal court appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory orders.299 The broad approach—which uses Rooker-Feldman
to prohibit federal district courts from reviewing both final and
interlocutory state court judgments—is the only rule that enforces
separation of powers by ensuring that courts stay within their jurisdictional boundaries.
B. Applying Rooker-Feldman to State Court Interlocutory Orders
Advances Principles of Federalism
Extending Rooker-Feldman to state court interlocutory orders
preserves the delicate balance of judicial federalism.300 Preventing
federal district courts from reviewing all state court judgments meet-

296. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 24-27. As explained above in Part IV.C, the First Circuit outlined three situations in which state proceedings have “ended” for purposes of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) the highest state court has rendered a final judgment that
qualifies for Supreme Court review under § 1257; (2) neither party seeks further action in
state court; or (3) the state judgment qualifies for Supreme Court review under § 1257
through one of the Cox Broadcasting situations. See id.; see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 479-83 (1975).
297. For example, Federación correctly recognizes that § 1257 allows Supreme Court
review of some technically nonfinal state court judgments. See 410 F.3d at 24-27 (citing the
Supreme Court’s analysis from Cox Broadcasting).
298. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1189 (“Congress has the responsibility for determining the precise contours of federal jurisdiction . . . .”); Chang, supra note 54, at 1349 (“The
federal district courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction which
Congress determines is appropriate.” (citation omitted)); see also Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
299. The exceptions include Supreme Court review of nonfinal state court judgments
that qualify under Cox Broadcasting and federal district court review of state court judgments in the limited contexts of bankruptcy, habeas corpus, and Indian child custody proceedings. See supra note 283.
300. See, e.g., Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003).
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ing the Exxon Mobil criteria301 is the only way to ensure that judicial
review occurs separately in our two sovereign and independent court
systems, with ultimate review in the U.S. Supreme Court.302 Entry of
judgment by a state court—including issuance of an interlocutory
order—constitutes an exercise of sovereign power. A federal lawsuit
challenging a state court interlocutory order is just as much of an
“end run” around the state court system as a suit challenging a
final state court judgment.303 Both equally undermine the concept
of federalism.
Extending Rooker-Feldman to state court interlocutory orders also avoids antagonism between the state and federal systems.304 The
Supreme Court has emphasized that our dual judicial system would
cease to function “if state and federal courts were free to fight each
other for control of a particular case.”305 This harmful tension between state and federal courts is inevitable if federal district courts
can exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court preliminary injunctions, stays, rulings on pretrial motions, discovery orders,
and other interlocutory decisions.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should reject the narrow306
and intermediate307 approaches used by several circuits. The narrow

301. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to “cases [1] brought by state-court losers
[2] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments”).
302. See, e.g., Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . preserves a
fundamental tenet in our system of federalism that . . . appellate review of state court decisions occurs first within the state appellate system and then in the United States Supreme
Court.” (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997))); Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992)
(“[D]ismissal of the complaint [challenging a state court preliminary injunction] was appropriate under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which instructs us that the only courts empowered to review for constitutional error the New York trial court’s preliminary injunction are the appellate New York courts and, ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United
States.”).
303. See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]iling suit with the
district court [after an intermediate state-court interlocutory order] was the type of end
run around an adverse state court ruling that we have explicitly rejected.” (citing Maple
Lanes, Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1999))); see also Brown & Root, Inc. v.
Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[t]he independence of state
courts would surely be compromised” if state court interlocutory orders “merely rang the
opening bell for federal litigation of the same issues”).
304. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986);
Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds
481 U.S. 1 (1987).
305. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970).
306. See supra Part IV.A; see also TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th
Cir. 2005) (using narrow approach in which “an interlocutory ruling does not evoke the
[Rooker-Feldman] doctrine”).
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approach, under which Rooker-Feldman protects only final state
court judgments, ignores concerns relating to federalism.308 The intermediate approach, under which the doctrine protects some state
court interlocutory orders, does not go far enough.309 The broad approach is the only rule that preserves the essential attributes of judicial federalism by protecting final and interlocutory state court
judgments from collateral attack in federal courts.
C. Extending Rooker-Feldman to Interlocutory Orders Recognizes
the Competence of State Courts on Federal Issues
The broad approach also is the only rule consistent with the concept of parity between state and federal courts.310 Although scholars
debate whether state courts underenforce federal rights,311 the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that state courts are competent to decide federal claims.312 The concept of parity underlies the
entire Rooker-Feldman doctrine—by prohibiting federal district
courts from reviewing state court judgments, the doctrine assumes
that state courts will fully and fairly adjudicate federal claims.313
In light of this rationale, Rooker-Feldman should bar federal district courts from reviewing state court decisions, regardless of whether those decisions are final judgments or interlocutory orders. If state
courts are competent to issue final judgments in cases involving federal claims, it defies logic to suggest that they are somehow not com-

307. See Part IV.C; see also Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del
Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23-25 (1st Cir. 2005) (using intermediate approach in which
some, but not all, interlocutory orders trigger Rooker-Feldman).
308. As noted above, the narrow approach has two rationales, neither of which involve
principles of federalism. First, courts assume that Rooker-Feldman “is only necessary to effectuate the negative implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257—it is needed only to prevent lower
federal courts from considering cases that the Supreme Court is permitted to hear under
the statute.” Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (summarizing argument for narrow interpretation). Second, courts mistakenly treat the “state
proceedings ended” dicta in Exxon Mobil as binding. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F.
App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006); TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591.
309. Like the narrow approach, the failing of the intermediate approach stems from its
mistaken treatment of the Exxon Mobil “state proceedings ended” dicta as binding language. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 24.
310. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based in part on the rule that “state courts
are as competent as federal courts to decide federal constitutional issues” (citing Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975))).
311. E.g., compare Neuborne, supra note 190, at 1121-28 (arguing that federal courts
are more sympathetic to federal claims than state courts), with William B. Rubenstein, The
Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599-600 (1999) (arguing that state courts
offer institutional advantages for protecting federal rights).
312. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1988); Deakins v.
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976).
313. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16 (1983); Schmucker,
supra note 159, at 336; Smith, supra note 168, at 636; see also supra Part III.C.
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petent to issue interlocutory orders in those same cases. The broad
approach is the only rule that makes sense because it treats state
court decisions in a uniform manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts have mangled the Rooker-Feldman doctrine since its inception. Given this tradition of confusion, it is perhaps not surprising
that circuits currently disagree on whether Rooker-Feldman protects
state court interlocutory orders.
This Article ends with a bold proposition: this particular facet of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not as complicated as it first appears.
A state court judgment is an exercise of sovereign power, regardless
of whether it is final or interlocutory in nature. The premise of our
federal system is the notion that both state courts and federal courts
are competent to adjudicate federal claims. The Constitution allows
federal courts to review state court judgments only if Congress has
expressly conveyed jurisdiction to do so. Under existing statutes, the
only federal court with appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments is the Supreme Court, which can (and occasionally does) correct errors that occur in both state and federal courts.
The bottom line is that Congress has not granted lower federal
courts jurisdiction to review state court judgments. As long as Rooker-Feldman guarantees that federal courts respect the true meaning
of this congressional silence, it is more than worthy of its place
among jurisdictional doctrines.

